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Writing a "surreply" in a law review symposium is almost always a mistake.
The author of the initial piece is inevitably motivated by conflicting and coun-
terproductive impulses. Initially, the author will always experience an over-
whelming feeling of gratitude that leading scholars took the time to write re-
sponses. I certainly feel this. The four responses to my article, Stuck! The Law
and Economics of Residential Stagnation,' are serious, in-depth, and thoughtful. I
am very grateful to their four respective authors. But focusing on one's appreci-
ation leads to saccharine responses, better fodder for thank you notes than for
the pages of a law journal.
On the other hand, any author reading responses to his work will feel the
ordinary pugilistic or debater's instinct to respond to criticism. This leads to ex-
cessively defensive responses. Further, if the initial article -weighing in at a
mammoth 77 pages -needs additional explanation, there are bigger problems
than a surreply can handle. There is no winning.
But there are at least two reasons to write a surreply, and both are relevant
here. First, if responses to an article contain exciting ideas, a surreply can com-
bine their insights with his own to lay out a useful roadmap of new directions
for future work. This applies to Sheila Foster's and Sara Pratt's responses.2 Pratt
1. David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78
(2017).
2. Sheila R. Foster, The Limits of Mobility and the Persistence of Urban Inequality, 127 YALE
L.J. F. 480 (2017), http://www.yaelawjoumal.org/forum/the-limits-of-mobility-and-the
-persistence-of-urban-inequality [http://perma.cc/CW7M-2NRQ]; Sara Pratt, Civil Rights
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focuses on the important role of racial discrimination in erecting barriers to mo-
bility.' Foster argues that segregation and other problems internal to metropoli-
tan areas will reduce the benefits that would otherwise accrue from reducing bar-
riers to entry to metropolitan areas.'
Although I have a few disagreements with their comments, I agree with
Pratt's and Foster's basic claims. Future efforts, by me or others, should wrestle
with their insights directly. Combining their approaches with the ideas in Stuck!
should lead to constructive pathways for research on interstate mobility, civil
rights, law, and economic growth. These responses complicate and enhance the
arguments I laid out in Stuck! in a productive and much appreciated fashion.
Second, if the responses present not only constructive critiques, but also very
different views about the issues in question, a surreply can prove useful in point-
ing out exactly where important disagreements lie. Here, in their pieces, Michelle
Wilde Anderson and Naomi Schoenbaum offer arguments that, while com-
monly held enough, strike me as importantly and acutely wrong.'
Anderson argues that Congress or some other decisionmaker can and should
employ a set of policy solutions to revive declining metropolitan areas.6 Further,
she argues that infrastructure in these declining places should be replaced, with-
out much regard to the lower population that these projects would serve.' Doing
so will provide services to the many remaining residents and may make popula-
tions more mobile.
Rather than offering false hope that a government policy can resurrect for-
merly vibrant areas, I argue in Stuck! that a doctrine of graceful decline - allow-
ing and encouraging populations, housing stocks, and governments to shrink to
match existing economic conditions -is more realistic, promotes mobility, and
generates better outcomes for more people.' Infrastructure spending should seek
to accomplish the same goal, matching city size to current economic conditions,
whether it requires more or less federal spending in declining areas. This is a
Strategies To Increase Mobility, 127 YALE L.J. F. 498 (2017), http://www.yaelawjournal.org
/forum/civil-rights-strategies-to-increase-mobility [http://perma.cc/BZB7-RQ341.
3. See Pratt, supra note 2, at 498.
4. See Foster, supra note 2, at 480.
5. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Losing the War ofAttrition: Mobility, Chronic Decline, and Infrastruc-
ture, 127 YALE L.J. F. 522 (2017), http://www.yaelawjournal.org/forum/losing-the-war
-of-attrition [http://perma.cc/7AY2-XPM5]; Naomi Schoenbaum, Stuck or Rooted? The Costs
of Mobility and the Value of Place, 127 YALE L.J.F. 458 (2017), http://www.yaelawjournal
.org/forum/stuck-or-rooted [http://perma.cc/QQY5-VHVU].
6. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 522-25.
7. Id. at 540-42.
8. Schleicher, supra note 1, at 132-149.
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very significant disagreement, and I hope this Surreply clarifies the different op-
tions before policymakers.
Schoenbaum, like many others before her, romanticizes metropolitan areas
left behind by the modern economy as places where people are "rooted."' Resi-
dents of these places, she argues, will be happier, enjoy stronger social ties to
their co-residents, and experience better family lives if they just stay in place. o
It follows from her argument that we should not tempt people to move to more
vibrant job markets by reforming state and local laws that limit entry thereto."
This argument is misguided. Families and individuals can assess the relative
attractiveness of locations for themselves. They can decide whether to move to
hot job markets, despite the personal costs associated with moving, as long as
regulations do not artificially make entry and exit too difficult. The high housing
prices in places like San Francisco, Silicon Valley, Washington, and New York,
and the population inflows to places like Houston and Atlanta, provide clear ev-
idence that significant demand exists to move to places with higher wages and
greater opportunity.
More worryingly, Schoenbaum's anti-migration arguments provide a ration-
alization for the destructive and exclusionary behavior of residents of rich re-
gions in promoting land-use restrictions, occupational licensing, and other reg-
ulations that limit the ability of outsiders to share in the economic gains enjoyed
by "superstar" cities and regions.12 It no doubt comforts the locationally-com-
fortable to be told that keeping people out of their towns and regions actually
helps those who are physically excluded from regional economic success. In
Schoenbaum's telling, the homeowners of McLean, Virginia, Palo Alto, Califor-
nia, or Newton, Massachusetts, are not acting like a cartel, reducing supply, and
keeping working people out by refusing to allow apartment buildings or new
townhouses to be built." Instead, they are humanitarians, keeping potential mi-
grants out for their own good!
In contrast, in Stuck!, I argue that the policies supporting Schoenbaum's vi-
sion are not to the benefit of the excluded or to society more broadly: they keep
potential migrants from access to good jobs and render the country poorer and
more unequal. In the name of family values and preservation of "rootedness,"
9. Schoenbaum, supra note 5, at 47o.
10. Id. at 464-70.
ii. Id. at 474-79-
12. See Schleicher, supra note 1, at 114-22. See also Joseph Gyourko et al., Superstar Cities, 5 Am.
ECON. J. ECON. PoL'Y 167 (2013) (arguing that housing prices have grown in certain "super-
star" areas, crowding out lower-income households).
13. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J.
385, 390-409 (1977) (arguing that suburban homeowners' associations operate as cartels em-
ploying growth controls to reduce housing supply and increase their own home values).
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she offers ideas that would worsen inequality of opportunity and reduce eco-
nomic dynamism. This is another stark disagreement, and one that should be
aired clearly.
1. USEFUL NEW DIRECTIONS: RESPONDING TO SARA PRATT AND
SHEILA FOSTER
Sara Pratt's response agrees with the central points of Stuck!14 Specifically,
she agrees that lack of mobility is a major economic problem, caused primarily
by state and local policy." However, she challenges me on the grounds that limits
on mobility have concentrated racial effects and indeed are often based on intent
to exclude on the basis of race. Efforts to reduce limits on mobility that ignore
race will therefore not be effective.16 Instead, strong application of civil rights
laws will be necessary, she argues, for improving mobility."
I think Pratt is at least partially right. I argue that federal laws should target
state and local laws that limit mobility, and civil rights laws are a type of federal
law that can break down such barriers to mobility." This is precisely why my
article specifically mentions the Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing regula-
tions that Pratt helped develop when she served as an official in the U.S. Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development" as an example of the type of effort
the federal government could engage in to break down exclusionary barriers to
entry.20
Policies that are formally race-neutral, however, can also improve mobility
and in doing so, provide particular benefits to members of excluded minority
14. I have a few narrow problems with her response. Contrary to her claim that my article ignores
NIMBYism, Pratt, supra note 2, at 499, large sections of the article are devoted to the propo-
sition that cities and neighborhoods use zoning for precisely this purpose, for example Schlei-
cher, supra note 1, at 129. Additionally, the article does not ignore new research on Moving to
Opportunity, as Pratt suggests. Pratt, supra note 2, at 503. In fact, the piece cites several of the
same papers it is accused of ignoring. See e.g., Schleicher, supra note 1, at lo6-07 (discussing
Raj Chetry's study that Pratt accuses the article of overlooking).
15. Pratt, supra note 2, at 499-500.
16. Id. at 512 ("These examples suggest hat modest incentives to encourage mobility for afforda-
ble housing residents or voucher holders will be doomed to fail because of discrimination.").
17. Id. at 517-19.
i8. Schleicher, supra note 1, at 150-54.
ig. See Sara Pratt, RELMAN, DANE & COLFAX PLLC, http://www.relmanlaw.com/attomeys
/PrattS.php [http://perma.cc/7W9Q-WNCF] ("Ms. Pratt also participated in numerous pol-
icy development initiatives during her time at HUD. Her work included the development of
the proposed and final rule on Discriminatory Effects under the Fair Housing Act, the pro-
posed and final rule on the obligation to affirmatively further fair housing. . .
20. Schleicher, supra note 1, at 151.
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groups. For instance, reducing homeownership subsidies and property tax ben-
efits for long tenures are formally race-neutral policies, but in application would
reduce the incentives for local governments to pass exclusionary zoning regimes.
They would also make for a fairer tax regime, providing substantial benefits to
minorities, among others, who own homes at lower rates and have been histor-
ically excluded from many such subsidies.2
But Pratt is right to focus attention on the specific benefits of using civil
rights tools in this effort. Because exclusion is often racially disparate in effect
and intent, laws aimed at discriminatory exclusion will likely be effective at im-
proving mobility.
The aggressive application of targeted civil rights laws frequently provides
such widespread benefits. As Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres argue, minorities
often serve as "miner's canaries" for deep-seated problems in American society.22
Minorities disproportionately feel the negative effects of many policies or prac-
tices, but these policies and practices do not affect minorities alone. Civil rights
laws and litigation that challenge policies with disparate impacts thus protect the
entire population, not only those who suffer from discrimination. When the Fair
Housing Act is used to challenge zoning laws in Yuma, Arizona, or Garden City,
New York, the cases are brought on behalf of racial minorities, but their results
promote better housing policy for all.23
Breaking down racially exclusionary policies is an important end in itself. But
the aggressive use of civil rights laws like the Fair Housing Act may provide other
benefits as well. Applying the arguments from Stuck!, it follows that using the
Fair Housing Act in the way Pratt suggests may not only lead to a fairer society,
but also a richer one that suffers from less unemployment and economic inequal-
ity. If zoning rules (and other policies) that limit the capacity of minorities and
others to move to opportunity are struck down, this will facilitate effective mon-
etary policy, economic growth, and efficacious social welfare policies for the rea-
sons laid out in the piece. The macroeconomic benefits of civil rights laws are
21. I critique homeownership subsidies in detail in the article. Schleicher, supra note 8, at 127-30.
For a recent examination of how these subsidies operate to the detriment of racial minorities,
among other groups, see Matthew Desmond, How Homeownership Became the Engine ofAmer-
ican Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2o17/o5/o9
/magazine/how-homeownership-became-the-engine-of-american-inequality.html [http://
perma.cc/58PX-Z4VS] ("While most white families own a home, a majority of black and La-
tino families do not. Differences in homeownership rates remain the prime driver of the na-
tion's racial wealth gap.").
22. LANI GUINIER & GERALD ToRREs, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER,
TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 11 (2002).
23. Pratt, supra note 2, at 502.
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understudied, but Pratt's useful and important response shows that future work
should explore exactly these questions.24
Sheila Foster's response is similarly friendly, although it too offers important
challenges and suggests some real limits to my argument.2 5 She argues that even
if barriers to entry in growing job markets are reduced, intraregional segregation
and stratification will make interregional mobility less attractive and useful, par-
ticularly for working people.26 I think this, as stated here, is true. If many hot
metropolitan areas were less segregated and had fewer internal barriers to mo-
bility (and fewer tax benefits for local governments that engage in exclusionary
activities), they would attract more lower-income migrants today, and they
24. Gavin Wright has written a number of excellent pieces on the subject. See Gavin Wright, The
Economics of the Civil Rights Revolution, in TOWARD THE MEETING OF THE WATERS: CURRENTS
IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN SOUTH CAROLINA 383 (Winfred B. Moore & Orville
Vernon Burton eds., 2008) ("Economics and economic history are usually neglected step-
children at sessions on Civil Rights history"); Gavin Wright, The Regional Economic Impact of
the CivilRightsAct of 1964, 95 B.U. L. REV. 759 (2015) (assessing the economic gains forAfrican
Americans of the Civil Rights Act). Also, and bearing more directly on this point, the report
issued by Jason Furman in the article characterizes the AFFH as a response to economic prob-
lems created by exclusionary zoning. Jason Furman, Chair, Council of Econ. Advisers, Barriers
to Shared Growth: The Case of Land Use Regulation and Economic Rents, Remarks at the
Urban Institute 5-6, 11-12 (Nov. 20, 2015), http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites
/default/files/page/files/20151120_barriers-sharedgrowth_1anduseregulation and_
economicrents.pdf [http://perma.cc/KC3V-S7PE].
25. I have a few small problems with this response too, but I'll focus on one. Foster writes:
Using federal housing and civil rights policy to open up suburbs made exclusionary
by overly restrictive zoning laws, or to root out racial bias in housing markets, is
one thing. It is quite another issue, given the complex dynamics of mobility and
residential choice, to try to calibrate the "location market" through policy reforms.
To be persuaded by Schleicher's policy prescriptions, one has to believe that federal
action can overcome the individual preferences that shape where people locate and
the market forces that enable their choices. History suggests otherwise.
Foster, supra note 2, at 492-93.
The quotation refers to the title of an article I wrote with Daniel Rodriguez. Daniel B.
Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637, 638 (2012).
Yet, that article argued that governmental efforts to regulate location decisions are costly, cre-
ating deadweight loss: "A policy that, say, limits the height of buildings in a commercial
downtown will not costlessly reassign development that would have occurred downtown to
locate elsewhere in the city. Instead, it will impose deadweight losses by stopping firms and
individuals from locating in their preferred location within a city." Id. at 639-40.
This article does not reverse my position. Rather, it argues that the federal government
should create incentives for state and local governments to remove limits on locational choice,
not to "calibrate" the location market. Contrary to Foster, I do not believe that the location
market needs calibration; I argue that it needs unleashing from excessive state and local reg-
ulation.
26. Foster, supra note 2.
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would be even more attractive if the policy changes suggested in my article were
adopted.
That said, many of the steps I suggest for reducing external limits on inter-
regional mobility would also reduce such intraregional limits. If tax incentives
were enacted that encouraged rich suburbs to allow developers to construct
apartment buildings, this would both drive entry into the metropolitan area and
reduce intralocal inequality. If governments at all levels provided fewer incen-
tives for home ownership and stasis (like California's Proposition 13's property
tax benefits for long-term owners), we would see greater inter- and intraregional
mobility and likely less segregation. Many of the policies I criticize in Stuck! lead
to both reduced intraregional mobility and greater segregation and stasis inside
regions.
But Foster is essentially correct. Her argument suggests that federal re-
sponses to interregional mobility should be paired with policies designed to
make our regions fairer and more internally efficient. The article, she notes, is
"incomplete."27 So are all papers. There is much work left to do, and Foster
points us in a productive direction.28
II. REAL DISAGREEMENTS: RESPONDING TO MICHELLE WILDE
ANDERSON AND NAOMI SCHOENBAUM
The extent of Michelle Wilde Anderson's disagreement with Stuck! is not
fully clear. She states that she favors reducing density controls in rich regions
because doing so would "allow[] newcomers to capture and create economic
growth."29 Presumably, other limits on entry to these markets, like occupational
licensing rules, are harmful for the same reasons. Further, Anderson does not
suggest hat she favors limits on exit of the sort criticized in Stuck! - homeown-
ership subsidies, limits on the transferability of public benefits and pensions,
etc.3 o The central claims of my article are (a) declining mobility and exclusion
27. Pratt, supra note 2, at 498.
28. She not only points in this direction, but has importantly already gotten started on this pro-
ject. See Nestor M. Davidson & Sheila Foster, The Mobility Case for Regionalism, 47 U.C DAVIs.
L. REv. 63 (2013) (arguing that regional governments would promote and are justified by
interregional mobility).
29. Anderson, supra note 5, at 524.
30. Schleicher, supra note 1, at 122-32. Anderson does question whether a lack of mobility is caused
by legal limits, or instead by changing economies, noting large forces like declining manufac-
turing and the foreclosure crisis. Anderson, supra note 5, at 526-28. However, the very forces
she discusses should drive mobility - the worse off places are, the more reason residents have
to leave them. She also argues that people don't have enough money to move. Whether this is
true or not, the easiest solution to this problem is what I suggest in the conclusion of my
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from hot job markets have substantial macroeconomic effects; and (b) state and
local government policies create limits on entry into hot job markets and limits
on exit from declining ones that should be reformed or eliminated. In other
words, there is much on which we agree.
But we also disagree. Anderson offers a critique based on one section of the
article in which I argue that policies that encourage too-large housing stocks and
governmental sectors (and debt) in declining areas limit and, more importantly,
bias mobility in ways that are economically counterproductive." Policies, partic-
ularly a more aggressive use of municipal bankruptcy, should be used to help
cities and regions adapt to new economic realities. Anderson argues that rather
than focusing on facilitating mobility by shrinking cities, we should focus on
reviving declining areas, noting that her forthcoming book will provide sugges-
tions for achieving this goal.32 Further, we need to provide funds for the rapidly
deteriorating infrastructure in declining places because plenty of people still live
there, and current residents cannot pay for it themselves."
I very much look forward to reading Anderson's book, but I fear it will be
only the next in a never-ending series suggesting new ways to revive declining
areas. These efforts do not offer viable solutions because there is no reliable way
to fix declining places, if by "fixing" we mean restoring them to their former
glory. Just as we have different firms in the S&P 500 than we did a hundred years
ago, the variety and sizes of regions and cities required by a dynamic economy
and society change over time. We cannot stop some cities from declining and
article - simply giving people money to move, through a refundable tax credit or a direct
grant. Schleicher, supra note 1, at 152-53.
31. Schleicher, supra note 1, at 132-49.
32. Anderson, supra note 5, at 524 n.9 (citing MICHELLE WILDE ANDERSON, LEFT FOR DEAD: CITY
GOVERNMENTS AFTER THE FALL OF INDUSTRY (forthcoming 2018)).
33. She also argues we should maintain infrastructure in the rust belt because climate change may
force us away from the coasts. Anderson, supra note 5, at 540-41. Here we can see real differ-
ences in our approaches to urban development. If coastal places become uninhabitable, I am
not sure that the cities that were optimal in the nineteenth century would make sense for
residence in the twenty-first or twenty-second century. Preserving their infrastructure may
have a similar effect as the preservation of cities in France after the Fall of Rome. Ferdinand
Rauch and Guy Michaels show that the preservation of inland French cities after the fall of
Rome led to France losing out on the gains from shipbuilding technologies, while the demise
of Roman English cities led to the English moving in ways that fit the economic technologies
of its time. Guy Michaels & Ferdinand Rauch, Resetting the Urban Network: 117-2o2, ECON. J.
1 (July 6, 2016), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/o.iiii/ecoj.12424/epdf [http://perma
.cc/UU8X-QQ6X]; see also Schleicher, supra note 1, at 134-35 (discussing this work). The exact
horrors climate change will generate in future years remain unknown, but preserving infra-
structure in Wheeling, West Virginia, or Decatur, Illinois, does not necessarily increase our
options for adaptation - it may reduce them, by shuttling development into these places rather
than others that may fit our new needs, whatever they are, better.
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other cities from growing without stopping the economy or society from chang-
ing and improving.34 Particular combinations of people in cities and regions are
a technology on which the economy grows and relies; different technologies are
needed at different levels by the economy and society at different times.
Around the turn of the last century, it was extremely costly to transport goods
by road, and thus manufacturing firms needed to situate producers near ports or
railroad hubs." Cities and regions built around these transportation hubs be-
came strong and prosperous. But with the development of technologies like the
combustion engine and the shipping container, transportation costs fell and the
economy no longer favored those regions. Some of these cities had other amen-
ities that allowed to them prosper in today's economy.36 Some did not, and there-
fore, they declined. Similarly, rural areas once required huge populations to work
on farms. Changing technologies have made farming more efficient and thus
fewer people are needed in those places." The economy and society marches on,
and our location decisions follow."
34. Anderson notes that allowing places to decline is fiscally wasteful, as there is infrastructure
and housing in, say, Buffalo that could be rebuilt more cheaply than construction of entirely
new edifices in Colorado. The same could be said for firms that go bankrupt or decline; they
have huge physical plants and lots of cultural capital that are specific to their processes that
are lost when a firm is liquidated. A firm going under creates a substantial amount of loss, but
we let firms rise and fall because we understand that this type of loss is a type of creative
destruction that is, in the end, worth it. The same is true for cities. There is loss when cities
or rural places decline. But the cost of stopping them from declining - in lost economic growth
and in frustrated desires to live elsewhere -is too high.
35. See Edward L. Glaeser & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, Did the Death of Distance Hurt Detroit and
Help New York?, in AGGLOMERATION ECONOMICS 303, 303-05 (Edward L. Glaeser ed., 2010);
Edward L. Glaeser & Janet E. Kohlhase, Cities, Regions and the Decline of Transport Costs, 83
PAPERS REGIONAL SCI. 197, 197-99 (2004) (documenting the growth of American cities in
transportation hubs).
36. See Glaeser & Ponzetto, supra note 35, at 303-05; Glaeser & Kohlhase, supra note 35, at 197-99.
37. Kristofor Husted, How Rural Farming Communities Are Fighting Economic Decline, NPR
(Aug. 11, 2016, 1:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2o16/o8/11/48883796o/how
-rural-farming-communities-are-fighting-economic-decline [http://perma.cc/7R6F-B3JT]
(" [B]ecause of advances like herbicide-resistant seeds and more efficient tractors, farms need
fewer employees. The number of farm jobs in the U.S. plummeted by 14 percent between 2001
and 2013, according to the Department of Agriculture.").
38. Anderson seems to imply that I presented her position on subsidies for rural Oregon in a
misleading manner. Anderson, supra note 5, at nn.35-37 and accompanying text. Stuck! in-
cluded a very lengthy block quotation from her work. See Schleicher, supra note 1, at 144. In
her response, she misunderstands my critique of her position. I did not mention her discom-
fort with the use of local elections to decide tax levels in rural Oregon. See Anderson, supra
note 5, at 529 & nn-35-37 and accompanying text. Instead, I challenged her claim that we
should provide subsidies to rural areas because "there is existence value to rural living, just as
there is existence value to the forest ecosystems themselves - humankind made spiritually and
morally more whole through the existence of households and environments beyond the hustle
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Rather than seeking to keep our cities the same, I argue in Stuck! that a doc-
trine of "graceful decline" would provide better outcomes for both current resi-
dents and everyone else. Shrinking declining cities does not mean destroying
them -it means improving them.
If these declining cities were to have lower taxes - perhaps because they shed
debt in municipal bankruptcy proceedings, or because they offloaded responsi-
bilities on other levels of government -they would drive away fewer employers
and enjoy healthier local economies. Likewise, a smaller housing stock means a
city can provide better local services at a lower price and suffer fewer of the costs
of local blight. Rather than trying to return Atlantic City or Akron to their former
glory, we should attempt to make their housing stocks and their governments fit
the smaller local and regional economies they have now.
Regarding infrastructure, Anderson argues that these declining cities need
an "urgent round of reinvestment."" She seems to think that Stuck! argues that
we should punish declining cities by removing their infrastructure funds, shift-
ing these subsidies to the growing cities. That is not the argument I advance. I
argue instead that governments should remain neutral regarding locational
choices whenever possible, allowing people, residents, and firms to choose for
themselves where to live and work as freely as possible.
Of course, infrastructure has to be built somewhere, so my preference for
location-neutral policies cannot apply across the board. But while there is no real
discussion of infrastructure spending in Stuck!, the article's basic story could
guide how we think about allocating infrastructure spending. When deciding
what projects to fund, the federal government and states should choose projects
that fit the current reality of metropolitan areas. In many cases, this will require
spending more money in declining areas in order to right-size them.40 In other
cases, it will require transforming local infrastructure - replacing highways with
streets, for instance, or consolidating local schools. In still others, it will require
avoiding the temptation to build fancy new infrastructure in an effort to attract
bustle of urban materialism." See Schleicher, supra note 1, at 144 (quoting Michelle W. Ander-
son, The Western Rural Rustbelt: Learning from Local Fiscal Crisis in Oregon, 50 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 465, 500 (2014)). The justification she offered for subsidies was not that that they would
alleviate poverty or improve outcomes for rural people, but rather that people staying in eco-
nomically-declining rural areas would gratify the desires of urbanites that others remain in
the places that these urbanites imagine xemplify the purity of rural life.
39. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 540.
40. Declining cities frequently seek federal funds to knock down blighted buildings for example.
See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 1, at 138-39 (describing how Detroit, Buffalo, and Cleveland
have demolished thousands of vacant houses); id. at 139 n.273 (noting restrictions on the use
of federal funding to demolish housing).
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people to declining places. The next "round of reinvestment"4 1 should be de-
signed to help cities fit their current situations, not to try to bring cities back to
old population levels.42
Anderson importantly and usefully points to the infrastructure needs of de-
clining places, and on this point, her argument is very powerful.43 But she does
not make clear whether this needed infrastructure should target the new, lower
levels of population or, instead, should be used to encourage population growth
in declining areas.
Whatever Anderson's stance, this is a substantial debate among people con-
cerned about urban affairs. Many think the federal government should be in the
business of trying to revive declining areas; I do not, and I do not think it could
reliably do so even if it were. Further, infrastructure in places with large popula-
tions is also declining and needs replacing -as anyone who has tried to take a
train recently from New Jersey to New York knows intimately.44 Federal infra-
structure spending should not be used push development from one place to an-
other. Instead, we should allow people to move to opportunity and provide ser-
vices, including infrastructure, that fits today's economy and population
distribution.
Naomi Schoenbaum's response largely restates arguments she made in an
earlier, very interesting article, Mobility Measures.45 I responded to many of these
points in several places in Stuck!, and there is no need to rehash those argu-
ments.46
There are two further points to make here, though. First, Schoenbaum's
reading of Stuck! seems to ignore both the article's discussion of the incentives
of state and local governments and its focus on allowing individuals and firms to
weigh locational decisions without excessive interference. Second, the approach
defended by Schoenbaum's response is not just wrong but would also have del-
eterious political and social consequences.
41. Anderson, supra note 5, at 540.
42. See Schleicher, supra note 1, at 145 ("In many cases, the need for bailouts to economically de-
clining places is both intense and compelling. Permanent subsidies, however, without any
effort to encourage mobility away from dying places - or to credibly generate sustainable eco-
nomic growth in the targeted area -are counterproductive.").
43. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 534-35 & nn.51-6o and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Matthew Hamilton, Old New York Sees New Infrastructure on Horizon, U.S. NEWS
(Apr. 20, 2017, 12:05 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2o17-04-20
/old-new-york-sees-new-infrastructure-on-horizon [http://perma.cc/CG7Z-VRCU] (not-
ing New York's infrastructure challenges).
45. See Naomi Schoenbaum, Mobility Measures, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1169 (2012).
46. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 1, at 87 n.24, 110-11.
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Schoenbaum's response misunderstands or misreads some of the arguments
in Stuck!, and thus fails to respond to many of the arguments on their own terms.
For example, she states that I do "not think that the people who are stuck (or
anyone else) would have any interest in their staying put;"4 7 that I argue that
"relationships matter only for the economic gains they bring rather than for the
other benefits they might confer or the value they may have even in their own
right;"4 8 and that I ignore that some people are unhappy living in big cities,49
that rich areas often have higher rents,o and that "strong ties" to other individ-
uals improve productivity.1
But I don't say or do any of this. Stuck! does not defend some kind of forced
relocation program that transplants plucky families from Akron, Ohio, to one-
bedroom apartments in Atlanta or Houston.52 instead, it argues for removing
barriers to locational choice - allowing people and families to leave whatever ties
47. Schoenbaum, supra note 5, at 462. The portion of Stuck! she cites does not support this claim.
She quotes this statement from Stuck!: "It is not clear why the country as a whole or a state in
particular should want residents to remain in, say, Atlantic City rather than move to the New
York City suburbs, which would give them access to a better labor market." Id. at 462 n.22. As
one can tell from the quotation, I did not argue that individuals have no interest in staying put,
but that the government lacks a clear interest in subsidizing them or encouraging them to stay
put.
48. Id. at 463.
49. See id. at 475-76. Schoenbaum strikes at an imaginary target. Stuck! discusses the benefits of
moving to hot job markets or metropolitan regions. To be fair, it frequently uses the name of
the central city around which the region is organized - New York, San Francisco - to stand in
for the region. But the paper just does not say much about whether people should live in cities,
suburbs, or exurbs in these metropolitan regions. Just as I think that people should choose
freely among metropolitan areas, I think they should freely choose among different types of
communities inside regions to the extent possible. (I do, however, think some externalities
commonly produced in suburbia should be taxed or priced, like congestion, water use, and
auto emissions, which would encourage more dense living.)
50. See id. at 475.
5i. Id. at 465. Staying in place furthers "strong ties," Schoenbaum argues, and these relationships
improve productivity (along with a host of other benefits). Fair enough. But Schoenbaum
argues that it follows that "mobility harms productivity." Id. at 464. If this were true on net,
places with high mobility or lots of migrants should have low productivity. New York and
Chicago at the turn of the last century, or London today, teem with migrants, from both home
and abroad, with people shorn of many strong ties. Schoenbaum seems to think these places
would have slow economic growth or labor productivity, while places like isolated parts of
Appalachia or Dark Ages Europe should have had high growth due to the preservation of
strong ties. Further, the period of declining mobility in America should be associated with
faster growth, as opposed to declining mobility occurring during the period of far slower
growth. See ROBERT GoRDON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN GROWTH (2014) (describ-
ing how U.S growth has been lower since the 1970s).
52. At one point, Schoenbaum refers to "[I]arge-scale relocation policies," Schoenbaum, supra
note 5, at 477 & n.116, which is not at all the solution I propose in Stuck!.
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them to their current locations if, but only if, they decide to seek greater eco-
nomic opportunity elsewhere." As I said in the article, people have legitimate
economic and social reasons not to move to the metropolitan regions where they
will receive the highest wages.54 The same is true of firms, which, as Schoen-
baum notes, form useful local networks." But people and firms should make
these decisions without excessive, government-imposed entry and exit limits.56
Stuck! does not criticize anyone's reason for staying put; it argues that govern-
ments should not make it too challenging to leave or enter, and it discusses the
benefits the nation could see from removing these barriers to mobility."
53. See Schleicher, supra note 1, at 107 ("Nothing in this Article suggests we should force people
to leave places, or even provide net incentives for them to move."). The only suggestion in the
paper that the federal government put a foot on the scale towards mobility is its support for
relocation tax credits as a second-best measure if removing policy barriers proves too difficult.
Id. at 107 n.124 ("The conclusion does suggest providing subsidies for mobility, but only as a
second-best solution to overcome barriers created by other policies.").
54. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 1, at io8-io.
55. See Schoenbaum, supra note 5, at 465-68.
56. See Schleicher, supra note 1, at 111-17 (discussing entry limits); id. at 122-32 (discussing limits
on exit).
57. Some of Schoenbaum's comments are about movers. Others, though, are about the people left
behind when others move. See, e.g., Schoenbaum, supra note 5, at 473. She effectively argues
that mobility creates negative social externalities. But people who move bear the majority of
the social costs of moving; they leave all of their current local contacts, while each current
friend and family member only loses the ones who moved. The social harms of mobility, then,
should be mostly borne by the same party who will see gains on the other side.
Further, it is not clear that the social externalities are weighted towards encouraging
people to stay put. When people move, they likely take into consideration the ffect on their
current friends and family to some degree: knowing that people you care about will miss you
is one of the hardest things about moving. Movers are unlikely, however, to consider the pos-
itive effect on the friends they will make in new places, simply because movers do not yet
know them. But when people move into a new place, they do create external benefits - resi-
dents in their new community gain the possibility of a new friend who could diversify their
existing social life. Migrants, both domestic and international, provide us with much. Con-
sider the great E.B. White on types of New Yorkers:
There are roughly three New Yorks. There is, first, the New York of the man or
woman who was born here, who takes the city for granted and accepts its size and
its turbulence as natural and inevitable. Second, there is the New York of the com-
muter- the city that is devoured by locusts each day and spat out each night. Third,
there is the New York of the person who was born somewhere else and came to
New York in quest of something. Of these three trembling cities the greatest is the
last - the city of final destination, the city that is a goal. It is this third city that
accounts for New York's high-strung disposition, its poetical deportment, its dedi-
cation to the arts, and its incomparable achievements. Commuters give the city its
tidal restlessness; natives give it solidity and continuity; but the settlers give it pas-
sion. And whether it is a farmer arriving from Italy to set up a small grocery store
in a slum, or a young girl arriving from a small town in Mississippi to escape the
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Schoenbaum also misstates or misunderstands a central move in Stuck!. I
argue that state and local governments have strong political incentives to care
about stability, but little reason to care about national problems like, say, the ef-
ficacy of monetary policy. This is an argument about different incentives- that is,
the relative political concerns of local, state, and federal government. She re-
sponds: "[C] ommunities where people stay put- which are all across the coun-
try-are part of the nation."" I agree, but it is not clear that this point matters.
Local zoning decisions, occupational licensing rules, and so forth are set by state
and local governments but harm people living in other places who get no say in
them. In other words, the problem is that these decisions create externalities. In
not responding to this point, Schoenbaum neglects the incentives of state or local
governments.9
indignity of being observed by her neighbors, or a boy arriving from the Corn Belt
with a manuscript in his suitcase and a pain in his heart, it makes no difference:
each embraces New York with the intense excitement of first love, each absorbs
New York with the fresh eyes of an adventurer, each generates heat and life to dwarf
the Consolidated Edison Company.
E.B. WHITE, HERE IS NEW YORK 25-26 (1949). Access to diversity and fresh thinking, to "heat
and life" in White's telling, provide important social externalities as well. Put together, the
social externalities of migration are not obviously negative.
This is all pretty hard to work with when making policy. But Schoenbaum's arguments
show a clear preference for stasis, for being surrounded by the same people having the same
conversation forever-like living in the last episode of Seinfeld. See Caryn James, Television
Review; 'Seinfeld' Goes Out in Self-Referential Style, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 1998), http://www
.nytimes.com/1998/o5/15/arts/television-review-seinfeld- goes-out-in-self-referential
-style.html [http://perma.cc/5YRR-39Q5] ("But it's the next-to-last image viewers will keep
with them: Jerry, Elaine, George and Kramer sitting in a jail cell as if in some road company
version of "No Exit." . . . It's easy to see these four nattering at each other into eternity.").
Doubtless, this is a vision of the good life, but it is not obvious that public policy should be
slanted towards it.
58. Schoenbaum, supra note 5, at 469.
59. Near the end of her response, Schoenbaum argues that there is a tension between federalism
and agglomerative efficiency. She writes, "Schleicher does not address the tension between his
views and federalism,' id. at 478, and in particular the harm that comes from people moving
to, or staying in, political communities that fit their preferences for public services. In Stuck!,
I wrote:
Further, local government by its very nature limits individuals from moving to the
best economic location. State and local governments provide a host of public ser-
vices and legal regimes - from schools to police to gun laws - that are tied to geo-
graphic location. When people move from Detroit to Houston, they can keep their
cell phone plans and Amazon Prime accounts. But they must take on a whole new
set of public goods and legal regimes - changing schools, gun laws, and so forth.
As I have argued elsewhere, this is a cost of having public goods provided locally,
as opposed to federally or by private contract untethered from geography. Of
course, local provision of services has many benefits, particularly (as Charles Tie-
bout famously argued) by improving fit between preferences and policies. But this
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Schoenbaum also makes claims that run counter to important evidence. She
suggests that people do not move to rich metropolitan areas because "gains do
not exist to be had" and that they may be better off, both economically and so-
cially, staying out of growing metropolitan areas.6 0 People are less happy, she
argues, in big cities, and so working people around the country should just stay
home and leave the horrors of life in San Francisco and New York to their long-
suffering existing homeowners and residents.61
This argument approaches the empirical debate on land use in an unortho-
dox fashion. There is a live debate, discussed substantially in Stuck!, about
whether laws, like land use regulations, or other forces are driving the decline in
mobility.62 But it is very clear that local land use regulations in many rich metro-
politan areas reduce housing supply and population growth, and drive up hous-
ing costs.63 Now, some people do claim that physical limitations - and not build-
ing restrictions -are why prices are high in particular central city areas like
fit comes at a cost: it undermines agglomerative efficiency because it forces people
to choose their locations based on packages of government services, rather than
solely based on an economic calculus.
Schleicher, supra note 1, at 123 & nn.195-98 (citations omitted) (citing David Schleicher, The
City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1540-45). To be fair, this passage
does not use the word "federalism,' but this text and the accompanying footnotes -which cite
a paper I wrote that is entirely about this tension - clearly discusses the tradeoffs between the
benefits of agglomerative efficiency and the benefits (and harms) of federalism and localism.
To make the point again, there are unavoidable tradeoffs between local control and agglom-
erative efficiency, but where local decisions do more than attempt o attract residents, but also
seek to exclude or tax leaving, the costs of local or state control increase substantially.
6o. See Schoenbaum, supra note 5, at 475-76.
6i. For what it is worth, the "Mississippi janitor" example is not mine - I borrowed it from Peter
Ganong and Daniel Shoag. See Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional Income Con-
vergence in the U.S. Declined?, 1o2 J. URBAN. ECON. 76, 78 (2017).
62. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 1, at 116 n.157.
63. Schoenbaum cites Raven Malloy, who wrote an interesting paper on the effect of land use on
labor fluidity (that is, on the number of job changes people make). See Schoenbaum, supra
note 5, at 46o n.11 (citing Raven Molloy et al., Understanding Declining Fluidity in the U.S.
Labor Market, 2016 BROOKINGs PAPER ON ECON. ACTIVITY 221-23, http://www.brookings
.edu/wp-content/uploads/2o16/o3/molloytextspringl6bpea.pdf [http://perma.cc/B58Z
-XQMX]). But this is not the point for which Schoenbaum cites Malloy. See Schoenbaum,
supra note 5, at 475 ("There may be some set of persons for whom restrictive housing and
zoning laws make the marginal difference between rendering New York or Silicon Valley af-
fordable or not. Schleicher does not suggest how large a group this is, and the research sug-
gests it is small or nonexistent."). In fact, Malloy (ne Saks) was the author of two of the most
important papers finding that land use laws substantially reduce construction and increase
housing prices in some regions. Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko & Raven E. Saks, Urban
Growth and Housing Supply, 6 J. ECON. GEO. 71 (20o6); Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko
& Raven E. Saks, Why is Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in Housing Prices, 48
J. L. & ECON. 331 (2005) [hereinafter Glaeser et al., Why is Manhattan So Expensive?].
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Manhattan. (This has been debunked-land use policy really is the main driver
of high housing prices, even in dense downtowns surrounded by water.64) But
it is hard to see how physical limitations could have driven up prices to current
levels at the regional level. No physical limitations stop people from building
houses more densely on the huge lots that pervade suburban Washington D.C.,
Silicon Valley, New York, or San Francisco. On these lots, people could replace
single-family homes with townhouses or triple-deckers, or taller buildings
where there are currently shorter ones. Nonetheless, prices have increased at the
regional level, too, and to levels far above construction costs - making clear that
the most important factors are legal limits.6 5
Schoenbaum also misses why housing prices in these areas are important.
Where supply is limited, high housing prices provide evidence of demand. Why
else would prices be so high? The fact of such high prices in particular regions
proves that people from all over want to move there. The fact that prices are so
much higher than the marginal cost of building housing is evidence that land
use laws are stopping people from moving in.66
Thus, the argument that "gains do not exist to be had" is belied by high
housing prices in these areas. Schoenbaum might think that people are wrong to
want to move to opportunity. But the behavior of people in housing markets
suggests that most disagree with this view.
Further, Schoenbaum's argument has troubling political consequences. Her
argument suggests that the people excluded from Silicon Valley, San Francisco,
New York, or Boston's labor markets by regulations are actually better off for
having been excluded. If so, residents in rich and restrictive areas do no harm
when they exclude new entrants with restrictive zoning laws and occupational
licensing rules. These exclusionary practices, in Schoenbaum's telling, do the ex-
cluded a favor. Those potential migrants not lured by high pay and opportunity
will have healthier marriages, stronger ties, and happiness and so forth. The fed-
eral government, she argues, should help wall off access to opportunity in grow-
ing job markets for the sake of social stability.
In contrast, I argue in Stuck! that these laws are both unfair and inefficient.
They keep poorer Americans away from richer areas that have higher wages,
64. Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks show that the difference between market prices in Manhattan and
the marginal cost of building an additional floor- which they call the "regulatory tax" - is best
understood as the effect of land use policy on local prices. They find Manhattan condominium
prices are 50 percent higher than they would without regulations limiting construction. Glae-
ser et al., Why Is Manhattan So Expensive?, supra note 63, at 350-51.
65. Id. at 359-60 (finding that twenty percent of total house value in Boston metropolitan area,
over thirty percent in Los Angeles metropolitan areas, and upwards of fifty percent in the San
Francisco Bay metropolitan area is due to land use restrictions).
66. See sources cited supra note 63.
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generate socioeconomic mobility, and have more generous welfare programs.
Because these exclusionary laws do such harm, the federal and state governments
should challenge them -using both carrots and sticks to break down barriers to
entry and exit.
This is another significant disagreement that should be stated clearly.
Schoenbaum's arguments bolster the soothing ideology that homeowners and
members of professional guilds that limit housing construction and competition
serve the common good. People do not like to think of themselves as selfish
members of an exclusive cartel, so theories of this sort allow insiders to rational-
ize political action that would otherwise be seen, by themselves and others, as
aggressive assertions of self-interest. Schoenbaum provides intellectual cover for
what Steven Teles and Brink Lindsay call "The Captured Economy" - the ability
of insiders to use regulation to "enrich themselves, slow growth, and increase
inequality."67 Arguments like those offered by Schoenbaum likely serve to protect
and justify the upward redistribution and economic inequality that results from
protectionism by local elites.68
Around the world, "superstar" cities and regions are generating more wealth
than ever before.69 Real and significant economic and social developments -
changes in information technology, the greater economic role of professional ser-
vices and technology development, demand for amenities, and many other
things - have made these places successful, even as other cities have declined.
Given the underlying technological and social structure of 2017, regional eco-
nomic policy presents a fairly stark policy choice. As a polity, we can decide
whether the gains from economic growth in superstar regions should flow to
incumbents - those lucky enough to have bought property or earned licenses
years ago - and to those rich enough to afford the high prices of access to these
labor markets. Policies that allow exclusion and slow mobility are the status quo,
and not changing things surely provides some benefits. If we accept exclusion
from superstar egions, it forces people to avoid the costs of moving, leaves intact
67. See BRINK LINDSEY& STEVEN TELES, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY (2017).
68. Remember how dramatic this all is. Wages would be as much as 8.9% higher if local govern-
ments in the San Francisco, Silicon Valley and New York metro areas did not restrict entry,
and almost all of the inequality caused by capital accumulation in recent years - the problem
at the heart of Tomas Piketty's work - is caused by gains accruing to landowners. See Schlei-
cher, supra note 1, at 115-16 (surveying literature).
69. See, e.g., Gyourko et al., supra note 12, at 167; RICHARD FLORIDA, THE NEW URBAN CRISIS
(2017) (on "winner-take-all urbanism"); SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEWYORK, LON-
DON, TOKYO (1991) (discussing "global cities" and their rising prominence).
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the character and look of existing neighborhoods, and allows parts of the pro-
fessional class to continue happily receiving rents.
Or, instead, we can increase and broaden the prosperity created by the rise of
superstar egions - by changing laws and allowing people to move to them (and,
by necessity, away from other areas). Doing so would not be easy. It would entail
difficult choices about how to provide services to the remaining populations in
declining places, hard conversations about how beloved neighborhoods must
change to accommodate new people, and coping with the churn and tumult of
competition.
As a reader, you can decide whether this is a fight worth having. I certainly
do. At the very least, I thought the stakes were high enough that it was worth
taking the risk of writing a surreply.
David Schleicher is a Professor at Yale Law School. Thanks to Leslie Arfa and Garrett
West for research assistance.
Preferred Citation: David Schleicher, Surreply: How and Why We Should
Become Un-Stuck!, 127 YALE L.J. F. 571 (2017), http://www.yalelawjournal.org
/forum/surreply-how-and-why-we-should-become-un-stuck.
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